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Abstract
Scenarios have been recognised as a useful tool for planning, which have resulted in a strong increase in the number of (multi-
scale) scenarios in climate change research. This paper addresses the need for methodological progress and testing of conceptual
considerations, by extending the global shared socio-economic pathways (SSPs). We present a set of four European SSPs until
2100 and a novel method to develop qualitative stories for Europe equivalent to the global SSPs starting from an existing set of
European scenarios. Similar to the global SSPs, the set includes a sustainable future with global cooperation and less intensive
lifestyles (We are the World; Eur-SSP1); a future in which countries struggle to maintain living standards in a high-carbon
intensive Europe (Icarus; Eur-SSP3); a world in which power becomes concentrated in a small elite and where Europe becomes
an important player (Riders on the Storm; Eur-SSP4); and one where a lack of environmental concern leads to the over-
exploitation of fossil fuel resources addressed by technological solutions (Fossil-fuelled Development; Eur-SSP5). We conclude
that the global SSPs are a good starting point for developing equivalent continental scale scenarios that, in turn, can serve multiple
purposes. There are, however, methodological challenges related to the choice for equivalence and the exact methods by which
scenarios are constructed that need to be tested further.
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Introduction
Scenarios have been recognised as a useful tool for planning
in the face of irreducible complexity and uncertainty. This
particularly holds for climate change-related research, where
changes in socio-economic behaviour and related greenhouse
gas emissions are highly uncertain and take decades to man-
ifest themselves as temperature and precipitation change
(O’Neill et al. 2013; Moss et al. 2010; Vermeulen et al.
2013). As a result, the number of scenarios in climate change
research and beyond has increased strongly (see Hunt et al.
2012), together with new concepts, tools, and methods to
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develop them. For socio-economic scenario development,
however, the first seeds for today’s concepts and methods
were provided more than a decade ago (Kok et al. 2007;
Biggs et al. 2007; Alcamo 2001). Relative to the exploding
number of socio-economic scenarios, methodological prog-
ress has been lagging behind, with similar issues being put
forward repeatedly: top-down or bottom-up process design
in multi-scale scenario development (Kok et al. 2007; Kok
et al. 2016); development of qualitative, stakeholder-
determined scenarios (Oteros-Rozas et al. 2015) and/or quan-
titative expert-determined models and their integration
(Harrison et al. 2013); and the use of participatory methods
and degree of stakeholder involvement (Patel et al. 2007).
Despite increasing hands-on experience with developing sce-
narios, structural or theoretical progress has been slow, with
some promising recent exceptions (Schweizer and Kurniawan
2016; Absar and Preston 2015). Overseeing the breadth of the
environmental scenario development community, a number of
observations stand out relevant to this paper:
Firstly, recent scenario reviews have illustrated just how
many sets of scenarios have been developed, globally, nation-
ally, and locally (Priess and Hauck 2014; Amer et al. 2013;
Rounsevell and Metzger 2010; Rothman 2008). Although
they differ in theme, focus, and content, there are similarities.
Rather than developing scenarios from scratch, this (growing)
body of evidence on plausible future outlooks should be used.
Ample experience has been acquired with downscaling of
(global) scenarios particularly related to the Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment (MA 2005; Lebel et al. 2006) and
the IPCC SRES scenarios (IPCC 2000). Yet, to date efforts
remain largely uncoordinated and methods that build on
existing scenarios remain ad hoc. Secondly, there is a lack of
experiments, i.e. endeavours that go beyond a case study-
specific implementation aimed at high-quality outputs, to-
wards structurally testing conceptual recommendations on
complex systems, scale, and scenarios. Although existing con-
ceptual papers (e.g. Zurek and Henrichs 2007; Cash et al.
2006; Kok and Veldkamp 2011) are often quoted, recommen-
dations are rarely adopted. Landmark papers on multi-scale
scenario development methods (e.g. Kok et al. 2007; Scholes
et al. 2013) date back to, again, the Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment. As also argued by Schweizer and Kurniawan
(2016), there is a need to revisit the concepts and attempt to
link these with practical scenario development exercises. This
paper will address the need to expand methods to include the
use of existing scenarios, whilst operationalising concepts of
multi-scale scenario development.
The considerations above are particularly valid since the
completion of a new set of global climate scenarios, the rep-
resentative concentration pathways (RCPs; Van Vuuren et al.
2011) and the shared socio-economic pathways (SSPs;
O’Neill et al. 2013). The SSPs have been put forward as a
set of scenarios that would be a useful starting point for
scenarios development at others scales and for other sectors.
Contrary to earlier global scenario sets, the SSPs are partly
designed to be useful beyond their original purpose of being
part of the new global climate scenarios. The SSPs were con-
structed along two axes; challenges to adaptation and chal-
lenges to mitigation (see Electronic Supplementary Material
1, ESM 1). A close link exists between socio-economic chal-
lenges to mitigation and adaptation and the wider dimensions
of sustainability. The SSPs, thus, cover a large range of devel-
opment and sustainability outcomes. O’Neill et al. (2017)
openly invite other research groups to use, explore, and extend
the SSPs to other sectors and geographic scales. Indeed, since
their release, the SSPs have been used in multiple studies,
globally (Riahi et al. 2016) and sub-globally (Absar and
Preston 2015) with many more on the way. Most of those
studies apply the SSPs by using quantitative numbers for var-
iables such as population and GDP provided by the SSP da-
tabase at a country level (https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/SspDb).
Although a perfectly valid method, this does not address the
conceptual issue of downscaling, nor the sub-regional vari-
ability. At the same time, a small but growing number of
research groups also uses the narratives and extend the SSPs
employing novel tools and methods, based on multi-scale sce-
nario concepts (e.g. Schweizer and Kurniawan 2016; Nilsson
et al. 2017; Palazzo et al. 2017). This paper builds on and
contributes towards that second body of literature, with a spe-
cific focus on operationalising a conceptual approach.
Introducing the concepts
Zurek and Henrichs (2007) propose a conceptual approach to
link scenarios across geographical scales with two elements:
(i) the level of interconnectedness across scale or the similarity
of the content of scenarios at different scales, and (ii) the type
of scenario development process that is followed. Five levels
of interconnectedness are listed (a) equivalent scenarios,
where outcomes are directly transferred between scales; (b)
consistent scenarios, where higher scale scenarios provide
strict boundary conditions and main scenario assumptions
and drivers are set to be similar; (c) coherent scenarios that
follow the same paradigm and can be seen as a different rep-
resentation of the same scenario archetype (see also Section
‘Challenges and risks when developing equivalent scenari-
os’); (d) comparable scenarios, covering potentially very dif-
ferent aspects and connected mainly by shared concepts or
general issues that are addressed; and (e) complementary sce-
narios, when developed independently with differences in the
logics and assumptions across scales, but with complementing
information. The paper describes five types of processes by
which scenarios can be developed and the relationship be-
tween process and scenario content (see ESM 2). In the con-
text of this paper, it is important to note that Zurek and
Henrichs do not provide an operationalisation of the concepts,
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whilst the use of existing scenarios challenges their process-
related recommendations.
Objectives
In this paper, the invitation to use the global SSPs is taken as
the challenge of downscaling the qualitative narratives. The
main research questions were: how to operationalise this ‘ex-
tension’ of the SSPs, and how to conceptualise extension be-
yond the use of one particular set of scenarios? The overall
objective of the paper is to provide details on a novel method
for the development of a set of scenarios equivalent to a higher
level set, whilst consistent and where possible coherent with
another set of existing scenarios. A second objective is to
present the resulting European SSPs (Eur-SSPs) such that
these, in turn, can be used as an existing set of scenarios for
more local studies. We operationalise the concept of multi-
scale connectedness as proposed by Zurek and Henrichs
(2007) and evaluate its usefulness within the framework of a
large EU-funded project.
Methods
Broader research context
Within the European research community, there is an impor-
tant role for (large) international, multi-partner, EU-funded
projects. The research in this paper uses existing European
scenarios as developed within a project called CLIMSAVE
(www.climsave.eu) and describes work undertaken as part of
the IMPRESSIONS project (see Harrison et al. 2018; www.
impressions-project.eu). CLIMSAVE focused on climate
change impacts and adaptation; IMPRESSIONS on
adaptation and mitigation. Within IMPRESSIONS, multi-
scale, integrated climate and socio-economic scenarios, in-
cluding high-end climate scenarios and more extreme SSPs,
were developed. The integrated scenarios serve two distinct
purposes, namely as an input for a range of climate change
impact models for which quantification of the SSPs is needed,
and as a context for the development of adaptation and miti-
gation pathways. Sets of downscaled SSPs were developed
during professionally facilitated scenario workshops (see
Gramberger et al. 2015) for five case studies—continental
(Europe); multi-national (Central Asia); national (Scotland);
transboundary river basins (Iberia); and municipal (Hungary).
Each case has a different degree of similarity to the global
SSPs, based on similar but slightly different processes
(ESM 1 and ESM 4). Here, we focus on the development
process for the Eur-SSPs. Kok et al. (2015); Kok and Pedde
(2016); and Pedde et al. (in review) provide more detail on the
existing scenarios, the scenario development process, and
resulting multi-scale scenarios in IMPRESSIONS.
The starting point: existing socio-economic scenarios
Global socio-economic scenarios—the shared
socio-economic pathways
The global SSPs are a set of five scenarios that describe plau-
sible future outlooks of a range of demographic, economic,
technological, social, and environmental factors (O’Neill et al.
2013, 2017). The scenarios are relevant for both the analysis
of emissions drivers and mitigation measures, and the analysis
of societal vulnerability to climate change impacts and adap-
tation measures. The narratives are basic stories that can be the
starting point for more detailed scenario studies. The SSPs are
purposefully short and simple, but contain sufficient detail to
guide development of alternative scenarios related to the basic
SSPs. For many applications, ‘extended SSPs’ are likely to be
required, which would contain additional, more detailed infor-
mation for particular regions, sectors, or variables. For more
information on process and content, we refer to O’Neill et al.
(2017) and ESM 3.
Within this study, it was decided to use an even number of
scenarios, to minimise the risk that stakeholders or other users
would select one as the best estimate (Moss et al. 2010).
Additionally, SSP2 (Middle of the Road) lacks its own ‘iden-
tity’ as almost all elements change moderately, which could
hamper the process of developing new SSP2-based stories.
Consequently, SSP2 was excluded and is not described in
subsequent sections.
European socio-economic scenarios—the CLIMSAVE
scenarios
Within CLIMSAVE, a set of four socio-economic scenarios
were developed for Europe (see Gramberger et al. 2012; Kok
et al. 2013; ESM 5). The scenarios include a utopian future
where effective governments change the focus from GDP to
welfare, which leads to a redistribution of wealth, and thus to
less inequality and more (global) cooperation (We are the
World); a dystopian outlook where short-term policy planning
and a stagnating economy lead to the disintegration of social
fabric and the shortage of goods and services (Icarus); a future
in which strong economic recessions hit hard, but are success-
fully countered with renewables and green technologies
(Riders on the Storm); and a second dystopian future with
an increased gap between rich and poor, political instability
and conflicts, and people living in an insecure and unstable
world (Should I Stay or Should I Go).
Rationale for equivalent scenarios
The Eur-SSPs were the starting point for most of the other
case studies, and it was decided to make those as similar as
possible to the global SSPs and aim for two sets of equivalent
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scenarios, i.e. their outcomes can be directly transferred be-
tween scales. This had a number of consequences. First and
foremost, we refrained from including a large number and a
broad range of stakeholders during scenario development. The
stakeholder-driven process undertaken in the other case stud-
ies cannot guarantee to result in SSPs equivalent to the global
versions. Thus to ensure equivalence, we organised a meeting,
using the same methods as in the participatory workshops, but
involving exclusively scientific experts on scenarios as partic-
ipants (see Section ‘Developing European-shared socio-eco-
nomic pathways’). Secondly, the global scenarios needed to
take precedence over the existing European scenarios in case
of inconsistencies between the two sets. As a result, some
important assumptions and details of the European scenarios
were changed. Finally, to maximise similarity the Eur-SSPs
were constructed to be rather general, following the content of
the global SSPs.
Mapping the shared socio-economic pathways
onto the CLIMSAVE scenarios
The first step in the process of developing new scenarios for
Europe was to map the global SSPs onto the CLIMSAVE
scenarios, in order to maintain as much as possible the
European and stakeholder-determined flavour. Recently, nov-
el methods have been proposed to systematically link qualita-
tive elements of scenarios, also across scale, particularly
cross-impact balances (Schweizer and Kurniawan 2016) and
the factor-actor-sector approach (Absar and Preston 2015).
Although both could have been suitable, we preferred a more
informal discussion format. Formalising a post hoc compari-
son, e.g. by structuring drivers and their possible states, would
limit discussions on comparability of underlying worldviews
and perspectives, which were considered crucial. The map-
ping exercise was executed by a small team of researchers
prior to the broader expert workshop. There are many similar-
ities (see ESM 6): both have been developed as part of a set of
more integrated climate change scenarios; both served as an
input to integrated assessment models; and both were relative-
ly long term. Yet, there are also crucial differences: The
CLIMSAVE scenarios have a time horizon of the 2050s whilst
the global SSPs have an outlook until 2100.More importantly,
the CLIMSAVE scenarios used different main uncertainties
for the basic foundation of the scenarios, which hampers a
direct comparison. Overall, however, we concluded that there
were sufficiently strong overall similarities in the main eco-
nomic, environmental, and social aspects to perform a prelim-
inary matching exercise (Table 1). An analysis of this infor-
mation and the storylines of both scenario sets revealed that:
& Three out of four SSPs match one of the CLIMSAVE
scenarios to a greater or lesser degree.
& The strongest match is with the utopian SSP1/We are the
World and the dystopian SSP3/Icarus. A fair match is
found between SSP4 and Riders on the Storm, mostly in
relation to low social cohesion and other social indicators,
coupled with a medium and instable economic growth,
which leads to social stratification. Environmental inter-
est, however, is maintained and (local) policies are in
place. The match between SSP5 and Should I Stay or
Should I Go is poor, mostly because of the fundamental
assumption of a strong fossil fuel-dominated energy con-
sumption, in combination with a lack of interest in natural
capital. This is not assumed in the Should I Stay or Should
I Go scenario.
& Overall, the SSPs assume a higher economic growth than
the European scenarios. This is particularly evident from
the quantitative projections from the SSP database and the
scenario quantification embedded in the CLIMSAVE
Integrated Assessment Platform (Harrison et al. 2013).
Social sustainability is likewise lower in some of the
European scenarios.
In conclusion, the SSPs and the European scenarios match
to a degree sufficient to assume that they could be linked and
synchronised further. This is particularly the case for SSP1
and SSP3, and to some extent for SSP4. However, it was clear
that linking SSP5 to the CLIMSAVE scenarios was not
possible.
The second step was a more detailed comparison between
the global SSPs and the European CLIMSAVE scenarios. For
this, we used a list of so-called main uncertainties that was part
of the CLIMSAVE scenarios and matched those with ‘key
assumptions’ as listed in O’Neill et al. (2017). It is beyond
the scope of this paper to provide an in-depth overview of all
matches and how they were interpreted (see ESM 8). Table 2
gives an overview of the CLIMSAVE uncertainties and com-
parable global SSP main elements that were used to match the
scenarios. Some entries are identical (international coopera-
tion, globalisation), whilst most others are similar (attitude
towards human health and health investments).
Developing European-shared socio-economic
pathways
The final step was the actual development of the new
European scenarios during an expert workshop. We organised
a two-day meeting with 22 participants from the
IMPRESSIONS project in January 2015. Criteria to partici-
pate included geographical diversity (case-study representa-
tives), sectoral and methodological expertise (WorkPackage
leaders), age, gender, and knowledge of CLIMSAVE scenar-
ios. Although only project partners were involved, the
CLIMSAVE scenarios were developed using participatory
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methods, which ensured stakeholder views to be part of the
final product. During the meeting, the following aspects were
discussed and confirmed or agreed upon: First, the initial map-
ping of the global SSPs onto the CLIMSAVE scenarios using
the degree of compatibility between the CLIMSAVE and
global SSP uncertainties (Table 2). Subsequently, an outline
of new stories for three time slices (2010–2040, 2040–2070,
2070–2100) based on the list of uncertainties, CLIMSAVE
stories, and global SSPs, thus extending the CLIMSAVE sce-
narios from the 2050s to 2100. Finally, trends and quantifica-
tion of key model parameters were estimated for the new Eur-
SSPs to match the global equivalent (see ESM 10). The output
of the workshop was a first draft of the storylines for the three
Eur-SSPs which closely match the CLIMSAVE scenarios, and
the development of an outline for a European version of SSP5.
There was also consensus on the process by which the stories
should be further fleshed out.
After the workshop, for every time slice and for every
scenario, stories of about one page in length were constructed
that are equivalent to the global SSPs, and as similar as pos-
sible to the CLIMSAVE scenarios. In this process, we first
examined the CLIMSAVE scenario text. If this was sufficient-
ly similar, we used or adapted it. As part of the process, we
examined the need to modify the ending of the CLIMSAVE
scenarios around the 2050s to ensure that they could be ex-
tended to 2100. Where it was not, we used and extended the
global SSP text. Figure 1 summarises the logic that was
followed; Table ESM 4 provides the details for all Eur-SSPs
and time slices. To illustrate the practicalities of the process,
the process for Eur-SSP1 is elaborated in ESM 9.
Table 1 Comparison of CLIMSAVE and global-shared socio-economic pathway (SSP) scenarios with a focus on Europe with illustrative examples of
economic, environmental, and social content
Socio-economic
scenario
Economic growth Environmental policies Social cohesion Match
We are the World
SSP1
Gradual increase
Medium in high-income countries
Effective sustainable solutions
Towards sustainable development
High
High
Very similar
Icarus
SSP3
Gradual decline
Slow
No priority and ineffective
Low priority
Decline, then picking up
Low
Very similar
Riders on the Storm
SSP4
Up and down, declining
Medium in high-income countries
Effective solutions
Focus on local issues
Low
Low and stratified
Similar in many aspects, but
different for some, including
income growth
Should I Stay or
Should I go?
SSP5
Up and down
High
Ineffective solutions, no priority
Priority when related to well-being
Low, but growing
High
Strong differences in economic
and social factors
Table 2 CLIMSAVE
uncertainties and comparable
global-shared socio-economic
pathway (SSP) main elements
used to match the scenario sets
CLIMSAVE uncertainty Global SSP main element
Decision making level (local/international) Globalisation
Geopolitical stability (low/high) Political orientation
International cooperation (weak/strong) International cooperation
Social and environmental respect of non-state actors (low/high) Social cohesion
Population/migration (within regions/between regions) Migration
Economic development (gradual/rollercoaster) Economic growth and inequality
Globalisation (constrained/unconstrained) Globalisation
Choice (restricted/free) Societal participation
Attitude towards human and natural health (influential/respectful) Health investments and environmental
policy
Social cohesion (low/high) Social cohesion
Solutions by innovation to depletion of natural resources
(non-effective/effective)
Institutions and technology
development
Social belief systems (plural/dominant) Societal participation
Health investments (low/high) Health investments
Education (low/high) Education
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Results
Similar to the global SSPs, the Eur-SSPs consist of various
products. Here, we limit ourselves to a presentation of a sum-
mary of the stories with accompanying trends for key ele-
ments (Section ‘The basic European-shared socio-economic
pathways—stories and trends’) and an analysis thereof. A
second main output of the workshop, (quantified) trends in
key model parameters, are provided in ESM 10 (see also
Pedde et al. 2018).
The basic European-shared socio-economic
pathways—stories and trends
A summary of the four Eur-SSPs is provided; the full stories
can be found in ESM 7. The first sentence of each SSP story
describes the general developments and is largely taken from
the text of the global SSPs (O’Neill et al. 2017). Table 3
summarises some of the key elements across all four Eur-
SSPs; Fig. 2 positions the scenarios along two axes.
European-shared socio-economic pathway 1 (Eur-SSP1)—We
are the World
There is a high commitment to achieve sustainable develop-
ment goals through effective governments and global cooper-
ation, ultimately resulting in less inequality and less resource-
intensive lifestyles.
The interplay of financial, environmental, and economic
crises fuel the feeling that behaviour has to change away from
an unregulated market-driven economy to a sustainable devel-
opment path. This puts governments under pressure to take
ambitious measures, including stimulating an energy transi-
tion towards renewables and facilitating innovative research,
accompanied by investments in health, education, and social
support. A decrease in conflicts in Europe’s southern and east-
ern border regions leads to higher political stability and mod-
erate but steady economic growth in an increasingly equitable
Europe. The European Union expands further and participates
in new global governance initiatives. Advances in green tech-
nologies are further stimulated by international competition
leading to a CO2 neutral society by 2050. By 2100, Europe
is characterised by a high level of sustainability-oriented po-
litical and societal awareness, focusing on renewable energy
and low-material growth in a strongly regulated but effective
multi-level governance structure.
European-shared socio-economic pathway 3 (Eur-SSP3)
—Icarus
Sparked by economic woes in major economies and regional
conflict, antagonism between and within regional blocs in-
creases, resulting in the disintegration of social fabric and
many countries struggling to maintain living standards.
With the economy gradually picking up, the demand for
resources increases, which turns out to be a tipping point for
the state of the environment with severe ecosystem failures.
The persistence of conflicts and decline in trade also substan-
tially increases energy and food prices, whilst initiating a mas-
sive build-up of the military industry, which is resource hun-
gry but not resource efficient. Long-term policy planning be-
comes rare with hardly any money for education, research or
innovation. Eventually, the EU breaks down, with new region-
al blocs forming in the north and in the south of Europe, whilst
new alliances with other countries are forged to ensure suffi-
cient energy supply. Social countermovements temporarily
appear but do not take root in a fragmented and divided
Europe with strong regional rivalry and conflict. Ultimately,
a high-carbon intensive Europe emerges that is not worse off
than the rest of the world, but struggles not to become the
Fig. 1 Schematic representation
of decision tree followed to
develop the European Shared
Socio-economic Pathways
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world’s backwater with high inequalities predominantly be-
tween, but also within, countries.
European-shared socio-economic pathway 4 (Eur-SSP4)
—Riders on the Storm
Globally, power becomes more concentrated in a relatively
small political and business elite, accompanied by increasing
disparities in economic opportunity, leading to substantial pro-
portions of populations having a low level of development,
although Europe becomes an important player in a world full
of tensions.
Sparked by economic crisis and extreme weather events,
the EU increases commitment to find innovative solutions to
the depletion of natural resources and climate change. In com-
bination with current relatively high levels of social cohesion,
Table 3 Key elements of the four European-shared socio-economic pathways (Eur-SSPs), representing the situation towards 2100
Key elements Eur-SSP1
We are the World
Eur-SSP3
Icarus
Eur-SSP4
Riders on the Storm
Eur-SSP5
Fossil-fuelled Development
Decision-making
level
International/EU leader National/local widespread
fragmentation
International / Europe leader on
the global scale
International/EU not a leader on
the global scale
International
cooperation
Strong, EU important player Weak Strong, EU important player Strong (trade)
Migration Low immigration Outmigration Selected immigration High to cities and from poorer
countries
Economic
development
Gradual (with hiccups at the
beginning)
Low High High
Mobility No barriers, but movements
are limited
Low High High
Social cohesion High Low EU/higher within
countries
Low High
Technology
development
High, but not pervasive Low High in some areas; low in labour
intensive areas
Strong and crucial
Quality of
Governance
High—focus on
sustainability
Low and ineffective High and effective High with focus on businesses
Human health
investments
High Low High for elites, medium for lower
class
High
Education
investments
High Low High for elites, medium for lower
class
High
Environmental
respect
High Low High in pockets Low, with high 'not in my
backyard'
Fig. 2 Four European Shared
Socio-economic Pathways
representing different
combinations of degree of
inequality and carbon intensity
per unit of Gross Domestic
Product
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energy efficiency, and environmental policy making this ini-
tiates a shift towards a high-tech green Europe. This transfor-
mation is strongly supported by large businesses that success-
fully seek collaboration with the increasingly powerful
European government. At the same time, however, inequal-
ities are rising because of a number of simultaneously acting
factors, including highly unequal investments in education.
This leads to a large and widening gap between an interna-
tionally connected society and a more fragmented collection
of lower income societies that work in a labour intensive, low-
tech economy. Technological development has not resulted in
reduced energy prices, but has instead established an oligar-
chy of green business developers that control energy supply.
By 2100, Europe is relatively strong, but with growing in-
equalities across and within European countries.
European-shared socio-economic pathway 5 (Eur-SSP5)
—Fossil-fuelled Development
People place increasing faith in competitive markets, innova-
tion, and participatory societies to produce rapid technological
progress and development of human capital as the path to
sustainable development. A lack of environmental concern
leads to the exploitation of abundant fossil fuel resources.
Global markets are increasingly integrated, with interven-
tions focused on removing institutional barriers. There are also
strong investments in health, education, and institutions to
enhance human and social capital. The push for economic
and social development is coupled with the exploitation of
abundant fossil fuel resources, including large-scale extraction
of shale gas. This further stimulates economic wealth, part of
which is used to stimulate the development of (green) tech-
nologies. Europe regains its leading position in the global
economy. Faith is strong in the ability to effectively manage
social and ecological systems, including by geo-engineering.
Population across all societal classes adopts a very energy-
intensive lifestyle. The environment degrades, but the major-
ity of the population is unaware because of successful techno-
logical innovation. Towards 2100, the environment is locally
seriously degraded as non-renewables are further exploited,
which eventually results in a slow re-emergence of invest-
ments in renewables.
Analysis across the European-shared socio-economic
pathways
The Eur-SSPs were constructed to be equivalent to the global
SSPs and, therefore, likewise to cover a broad range of chal-
lenges to mitigation and adaptation, which makes them rele-
vant for the climate change community in Europe.
Additionally, like the global SSPs, the Eur-SSPs cover a wide
range of the dimensions of sustainability and development, by
including highly unequal (SSP3 and SSP4) and equal (SSP1
and SSP5) societies, but also very resource intensive (SSP5
and SSP3) and lower consumption worlds (SSP1 and SSP4).
Within the set of SSPs, Eur-SSP4 arguably stands out as both
the most ‘difficult’ story to tell and the most interesting addi-
tion, because of a high inequality within countries in combi-
nation with a strong and connected elite that nonetheless per-
sists in a society with low human and social capital, yet with,
e.g. strong technological development and high financial cap-
ital. SSP3 and SSP4 are rather similar, regarding a large share
of the key elements and parts of the narrative. There are dif-
ferentiating assumptions (inequality, technological develop-
ment), but their main difference is in the associated potential
GHG-emissions, which are rather low for SSP4 and high for
SSP3. The same holds for SSP1 and SSP5, with potentially
low emissions for SSP1 and very high emissions for SSP5.
This reflects a main motive from the global climate change
community to explore future outlooks that decouple chal-
lenges to mitigation and adaption, under relatively similar
socio-economic circumstances.
Discussion
From concepts to practise—methods to develop
equivalent scenarios
One of the main challenges described in this paper is the
development of a set of Eur-SSPs equivalent to a higher level
set, whilst consistent and where possible coherent with anoth-
er set of existing scenarios. The resulting set of Eur-SSPs can
be considered equivalent with the higher-level global SSPs,
whilst three out of four were consistent with the CLIMSAVE
scenarios that were used as a second starting point. The de-
velopment of the Eur-SSPs using two sets of existing scenar-
ios at different (temporal and spatial) scales thus proved to be
successful.
Yet, there are important methodological aspects that de-
serve more attention. Firstly, the mapping exercise was rather
subjective. There are no pre-existing guidelines to decide
whether similarities are sufficient to pair two scenarios. In case
of a good match, the exercise might seem more straightfor-
ward, but the devil is in the details. For example, Eur-SSP1,
that needed to be constructed from a global SSP1 that assumed
relatively high economic growth and We are the World that
assumes a dematerialising Europe. In case of a partial but
sufficient match, criteria are lacking, and ‘partial’ comes in
many shapes: Part of the geographical area, part of the tem-
poral extent, part of the sectors, etc. In the case of Eur-SSP4,
the experts during the workshop felt that the global SSP4
could be combined with Riders on the Storm. The lack of
European-specific information in the global SSP4 and the
shorter time horizon on Riders on the Storm made it difficult
to substantiate the claim that the resulting Eur-SSP4 is
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equivalent with its global counterpart. In case of an insuffi-
cient match, objective criteria are likewise missing. In the case
of SSP5 and Should I Stay or Should I Go, we based our
conclusion on important aspects such as globalisation, social
cohesion, and economic growth, in a workshop setting with a
large number of experts, both on the CLIMSAVE scenarios
and the global SSPs. This decision is justifiable as the two
worlds are fundamentally different, but rather subjective.
Secondly, comparing uncertainties and their polarities
(CLIMSAVE scenarios) and key assumptions (global SSPs)
is partly comparing apples and oranges. Geopolitical stability
is not the same as international cooperation, even if they are
not unrelated. The same holds, for example, for social partic-
ipation and social cohesion. This is directly related to the fact
that the processes by which the scenarios were developed
were completely independent. This will be an issue for any
combination of existing scenarios.
Thirdly, the scenario development exercise was likewise
rather subjective. Crucial choices were made for every time
slice on what scenario to use (see Fig. 1), without clear criteria
for when detail for Europe was sufficient to use the text, or
whether two sets of stories were equivalent or equivalence is
needed to be created. Note that ‘equivalence’ is defined in
terms of ‘outcomes’, thus including more than the stories. In
IMPRESSIONS, we used some of the quantifications for
Europe as given by the SSP database—notably population
and GDP, based on the global SSPs. Thus, by definition, the
outcomes were equivalent.
In short, it is fairly straightforward to show how a set of
scenarios can be developed that is (very) similar to two
existing sets of scenarios. Yet, the methods to create equiva-
lence with one set and consistency with another set are in their
infancy.
We hope that the method employed here can be further
fine-tuned in other similar exercises, as it will be tested in
other case studies of IMPRESSIONS. Particularly promising
advances could include:
& Morework on scenario archetypes (see Section ‘Challenges
and risks when developing equivalent scenarios’).
& Protocols to standardise what qualitative socio-economic
scenarios should contain. The Eur-SSPs have the same
elements as the global SSPs (stories, tables with trends,
and quantification of key parameters), yet they are not
easily or fully comparable. The use of structured methods
such as cross-impact balances (Schweizer and Kurniawan
2016) or the factor-actor-sector approach (Absar and
Preston 2015) could facilitate a full comparison up front.
& Develop equivalent scenarios during a stakeholder work-
shop. It is worthwhile to attempt equivalent scenario de-
velopment during a workshop with (a broader range of)
stakeholders, to increase usefulness, relevance, and/or le-
gitimacy of the new set of scenarios. This could lead to
tensions with the goal of equivalence, which is worth
experimenting with.
& Link with suggestions from recent multi-scale scenario
literature. Although not focusing on equivalence, structur-
ing tools such as cross-impact balances (Schweizer and
Kurniawan 2016); explicit a priori choices of granularity,
resolution, and scale (Scholes et al. 2013), or an external
consistency analysis (cf. Brand et al. 2013) are promising
avenues to pursue.
Characteristics of equivalent scenarios
The Eur-SSPs are equivalent to the global SSPs. This has a
number of consequences. An important advantage is that the
two sets of scenarios can be combined. Climate change (im-
pacts), for example, can directly be taken from the global
models. Additionally, assumptions on global trade, interna-
tional policies, etc. can directly be linked to the European
scenarios. Vice versa, global scenario users could include de-
tails from the Eur-SSPs in their global model runs. The tight
coupling between exploratory scenarios facilitates a tight cou-
pling between the subsequent uses of multi-scale scenarios.
Another advantage relates to the visibility and credibility of
the lower level scenarios, when equivalent to well-known
global scenarios. Many sets of European scenarios exist, but
those most known are often those that were linked to global
scenarios, notably the IPCC SRES (Rounsevell et al. 2005;
Verburg et al. 2008). The same will, hopefully, hold for the
Eur-SSPs. Finally, within IMPRESSIONS, equivalent scenar-
ios allow for a true cross-scale scenario development design
(see Gramberger et al. 2015). Using consistent or coherent
Eur-SSPs would inhibit the execution of developing local ex-
tensions of the global SSPs.
Challenges and risks when developing equivalent
scenarios
Developing and using equivalent scenarios bring about sever-
al important risks and challenges. Firstly, O’Neill et al. (2017)
introduce the global SSPs as ‘pathways’, which also means
that narratives are short and simple. Equivalence of a lower-
scale set of scenarios results in likewise simple and short nar-
ratives. As a result, the Eur-SSPs are less detailed than the
European CLIMSAVE scenarios, as we omitted material of
the existing scenarios to increase equivalence. This might
have also reduced relevant regional context material.
Secondly, by definition, the Eur-SSPs cover the same uncer-
tainty space as the global SSPs. Although not an unreasonable
starting point, Europe-specific uncertainties might have been
ignored. Because the CLIMSAVE scenarios consist of
stakeholder-determined stories and expert-based quantitative
models that were developed iteratively (Harrison et al. 2013;
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Gramberger et al. 2015; Kok et al. 2015), the risk of missing
key uncertainties was small. Thirdly, any shortcoming in the
global SSPs might be propagated, particularly related to the
newly added SSP4 and SSP5. Finally, this paper relates to
two-scenario sets for climate research. When using the SSPs
and existing scenarios that have been developed for a different
purpose other challenges surface: (a) Mismatches between the
drivers, factors, sectors, actors, and hence content will hamper
comparison and creating equivalent scenarios. As SSPs will
be sectorally extended, this challenge will reduce over time;
(b) existing scenarios might have been constructed using fun-
damentally different uncertainties, which might hinder
matching the SSPs. Particularly, when methods such as
Morphological Analysis or CIB have been employed, existing
scenarios might be difficult to relate. As these methods will be
more common, this challenge might increase.
In short, the resulting Eur-SSPs are an excellent product to
be further used, very much like the global SSPs. Yet, also
analogous with their global equivalent, they might be in need
of further ‘extension’. Moreover, creating an equivalent set of
European SSPs carries over any issue with the global SSPs.
Scenario archetypes as overarching constructs
A number of authors have proposed the classification of sce-
narios into a limited number of scenario archetypes or scenario
families (Hunt et al. 2012; Van Vuuren et al. 2012; Rothman
2008). Although the exact number and content of these arche-
types—particularly in the context of the global SSPs—is un-
der discussion, there are strong indications that existing sce-
narios can be clustered into a small number of more general,
archetypical descriptions. All efforts seem to agree that the
archetypes include a utopian future (cf. Eur-SSP1), a dystopi-
an future (cf. Eur-SSP3), and a future closer to business-as-
usual (cf. Eur-SSP5 and global SSP2). There is less agreement
on the plausibility and therefore desirability to include SSP4
as a scenario archetype. A future outlook with a powerful,
green, elite is regarded plausible in many countries across
Latin America and Africa, whilst in Europe plausibility, cred-
ibility, and therefore usability of such a scenario has been
questioned. Yet, the resemblance with the CLIMSAVE sce-
nario Riders on the Storm suggests that it is an emerging type
of future outlook, also in the eyes of the broader stakeholder
community. Work on scenario archetypes needs to be
prioritised and extended, because it has the potential to aid
in the comparison and categorisation of existing scenarios,
and therefore also in developing criteria to decide on the de-
gree of matching between scenarios.
Revisiting the concepts
The conceptual degrees of connectedness, as proposed by
Zurek and Henrichs (2007), have proven to be useful, whilst
the need for further conceptualisation has become apparent.
Selecting a type of connection before embarking upon the
scenario development process is an essential first step. The
choice for equivalent scenarios has led to important modifica-
tions in process and content of the scenarios, with a workshop
with experts rather than a broader selection of stakeholders
andwith resulting scenarios that were simpler than the original
European scenarios. Opting for consistent or coherent scenar-
ios would have led to different choices and a different product.
As argued in the Introduction, the scenario community has
more than sufficient hands-on experience, but lacks conceptu-
al foundations. This paper has helped showwhere those might
be found and how they can be operationalised.
The approaches that are listed by Zurek and Henrichs were
intended for developing new scenario sets rather than existing
ones and are, therefore, in need of revision given the increas-
ing importance of existing scenarios. Zurek and Henrichs
present a concluding table, where for example five processes
of scenario development are related to the level of connected-
ness. They conclude that it is (very) unlikely that independent
processes can lead to more than comparable scenario sets.
Based on this paper, this table should be reassessed when
starting from existing scenarios. We hypothesise a marked
shift from joint processes to rather independent processes,
with a need to adapt existing, independently developed mate-
rial, rather than jointly constructing newmaterial, but continu-
ing to aim for equivalent consistent or coherent scenarios
across scale.
Conclusions
We conclude that the global SSPs are an excellent starting
point to develop lower scale scenarios. The resulting Eur-
SSPs, in turn, can serve the same multiple purposes as its
equivalent set of global scenarios. The combination of global
SSPs with a set of existing lower-scale scenarios proved pos-
sible without jeopardising the European identity of the origi-
nal set for most of the scenarios. We hope that the set of Eur-
SSPs will be further extended across spatial, temporal, and
thematic scales. Whilst we advertise the use of the resulting
Eur-SSPs, however, there are methodological challenges re-
lated to the choice for equivalence and the exact methods by
which scenarios are constructed. Particularly, when existing
scenarios are not related to climate research, or when scenarios
cannot easily be related to the SSPs, seeking equivalence rath-
er than consistency or coherency might not be the best choice.
Methods employed need to be tested further, with a specific
role for scenario archetypes and recently proposedmore struc-
tured approaches to compare scenarios.
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